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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Matthew Conte filed a complaint in the Western District of Pennsylvania asserting 
a substantive due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against appellants, Sergeant 
Randy Ruediger, an officer from the Middlesex Township Police Department, and 
Officer David Wellington of the Mars Borough Police Department. Conte then filed an 
amended complaint. In response, the appellants filed individual motions to dismiss. In 
those motions they asserted, in part, that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The 
District Court deferred ruling on the qualified immunity issue and denied the motions to 
dismiss without prejudice. We will vacate the qualified immunity section of the District 
Court’s order and remand. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis.1 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 In reviewing an order denying a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity 
grounds, this Court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all inferences 
in his favor. George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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The events that gave rise to this action took place in June 2013. José Rios was 
parked on a public street in Middlesex Township, Pennsylvania when Ruediger noticed 
him. Ruediger initiated contact and then falsely suggested to Rios that he was a suspect 
despite the fact that Rios was not involved in any suspicious or illegal activity. Rios 
panicked and fled the scene. A chase ensued. 
During the chase, Wellington and another officer2 joined Ruediger. The three 
officers followed Rios through residential and commercial areas, sometimes reaching 
speeds of 110 to 120 miles per hour. The traffic was so heavy at one point that the third 
officer backed off of his pursuit of Rios when he was caught in a line of stopped cars. 
Because of these conditions, Wellington radioed Ruediger and questioned whether they 
should terminate the chase. Ruediger radioed the Northern Regional Police, who had 
jurisdiction at that point, to get clearance to continue but did not wait for a response and 
continued to follow Rios. 
The chase ended when Rios crashed into Conte’s vehicle while Conte was waiting 
at a red light at a shopping center intersection. Rios was traveling approximately 80 miles 
per hour when he hit Conte.  
Conte filed a § 1983 complaint in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the 
three officers, in their individual capacities, and their respective townships. He asserted 
that the officers’ pursuit of Rios deprived him of his rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Conte later filed an amended complaint.  
                                              
2 The other officer is not involved in this appeal. 
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The appellants individually filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint, 
asserting in part that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court denied 
their motions without prejudice, deferring a ruling on the qualified immunity issue. The 
District Court found that the amended complaint was sufficient to state a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim, but that more discovery was needed because of unresolved factual 
issues. The appellants individually appealed the District Court’s qualified immunity 
decision and their appeals were consolidated.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). This 
Court may have jurisdiction over a collateral order, such as the one here, if it is deemed 
final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court may review a qualified immunity ruling when 
the order appealed from “turns on an issue of law” because it is then deemed final.3 
Conversely, if the qualified immunity question “turns on the sufficiency of the evidence, 
it may not be appealed until the district court enters final judgment in the case.”4  
We have held that, where a district court holds that a complaint is sufficiently 
pleaded but defers ruling on a qualified immunity defense, “the practical effect of the 
district court’s order [is] a denial of the defense of qualified immunity.”5 As such, “‘[a] 
district court’s perceived need for discovery does not impede immediate appellate review 
                                              
3 Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). 
4 Walker v. Horn, 286 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Montgomery 
Cty., 215 F.3d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
5 George, 738 F.3d at 571. 
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of . . . legal questions . . . . [U]ntil [the] threshold immunity questions are resolved, 
discovery should not be allowed.’”6 
The District Court deferred ruling on the qualified immunity issue, reasoning that 
more discovery was necessary for the remaining material factual issues but did not 
specifically state what those issues were. The District Court deferred ruling only after 
considering whether the amended complaint had sufficiently established Conte’s § 1983 
claims. Under George, this Court has jurisdiction because the District Court deferred 
ruling on the qualified immunity issue only after it had considered the sufficiency of the 
§ 1983 claims. 
III. 
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government officials 
from liability for civil damages. In deciding whether to grant an official qualified 
immunity, the court must consider two questions: One, “[t]aken in the light most 
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged [in the complaint] show the 
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”7 Two, was that right “clearly 
established.”8 The order of these two prongs is interchangeable.9  
Here, the District Court identified the right at issue. The District Court then found 
that there were disputed issues of material fact and went no further, deferring a decision 
                                              
6 Id. (quoting X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
7 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
8 Id. 
9 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241–42 (2009) (“[R]igid adherence to 
Saucier departs from the general rule of constitutional avoidance.”). 
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on the qualified immunity issue. It reached this conclusion, however, without determining 
whether Conte’s Fourteenth Amendment right was clearly established at the time of the 
conduct at issue. Moreover, the District Court failed to identify what factual issues were 
relevant to its deferral. These omissions constitute legal error that requires us to vacate 
the order denying the appellants’ motions to dismiss.10 If the District Court at that point 
determines that such a right was clearly established, it may then determine whether the 
facts it already found to be in dispute—facts that were not clearly specified in its order—
are material to assessing whether that right was violated.  
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the qualified immunity section of 
the District Court’s order and remand. In vacating this order, we are not foreclosing any 
opportunity Conte may have to further amend his pleadings.11  
                                              
10 Forbes v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[D]ispositions of a motion in which a party pleads qualified immunity include, at 
minimum, an identification of relevant factual issues and an analysis of the law that 
justifies the ruling with respect to those issues.”); see also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 
F.3d 116, 123 (3d Cir. 1996) (“On remand the district court should analyze separately the 
conduct of each [defendant] against the constitutional right allegedly violated.”).   
11 Leave to amend must be granted sua sponte before dismissing civil rights 
complaints, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote 
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). 
